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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & CIVIL RIGHTS
A.

Equal Opportunity and Reverse Discrimination

As the United States has progressed toward the goal of equality for
all citizens, the difficulties inherent in eradicating the effects of three
centuries of racial and ethnic bigotry have led to a new problem, loosely
referred to as "reverse discrimination."1 The dilemma of reverse
discrimination arises when a decisionmaker, in either the public or
private sector, chooses a course of action designed to give preferential
treatment to members of a disadvantaged minority group.' The decision
to give preferential treatment to minorities normally entails imposing
some burden on members of the white majority.3 Recently, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided a case, Talbert v. City of Richmond,4
which involved a decision by the Richmond, Virginia Police Department
to promote a black officer instead of an arguably better qualified white
officer under circumstances that could constitute reverse discrimination.'
In Talbert, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's holding
that the city had violated constitutional mandates by refusing to promote the plaintiff because of his race.' The plaintiff, William A. Talbert,
a white police captain, challenged the procedures used by the city in
1978 to fill three vacancies at the rank of major.' Pursuant to the Richmond City Charter,8 the official responsible for making these appointments9 considered eight candidates certified for possible promotion from
captain to major by the city's personnel assessment center."0 Along with
' See generally B. GROSS, DISCRIMINATION IN'REVERSE: Is TURNABOUT FAIR PLAY
(1977) (definition and philisophic analysis of reverse discrimination).
2 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197-99 (1979)
(private affirmative action plan for blacks); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 273-76 (1978) (preferential medical school admissions program); Detroit Police Officers
Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 679-81 (6th Cir. 1979) (affirmative action program for police
promotions).
' See Young, Racial Classification In Employment DiscriminationCases: The Fifth
Circuit'sRefusal To PrescribeStandards, 11 CuM. L. REV. 347, 349 n.4 (1981).
648 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982).
See id. at 926.
6 See id.
See id. at 926-27.
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA CITY CHARTER, § 9.03(b)(1) (1975). The Richmond City Charter
mandates a "rule of five" whereby the number of candidates considered for any promotion
equals the number of openings at the higher level plus five. See id.; 648 F.2d at 927.
' See 648 F.2d at 927. The official designated to make police promotion decisions was
the Director of Public Safety. See id.
"0See id. The Richmond city personnel assessment center utilized a complex evaluation formula to grade each candidate on eleven separate factors relating to police functions
and past performance. See Joint Appendix at 166, Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925
(4th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix]. The personnel assessment center used
subjective evaluations derived from oral examinations and personal history rather than
written tests. See id. at 161.
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the ratings given by the assessment center, the appointing official
received the recommendations of the Chief of Police. 1' The Chief of
Police recommended the two white officers with the highest scores
among the eight candidates,12 but failed to recommend Captain Talbert,
who ranked third on the personnel center's evaluation list." Instead, the
Chief of Police recommended that the third vacancy be filled by Captain
Laurel M. Miller, a black officer ranked eighth on the evaluation list. 4
Captain Miller subsequently received the promotion to major. 5
In reaction to the city's failure to promote him, Talbert filed suit in
federal district court alleging violation of his civil rights by the city and
its officials. 6 Talbert based his claims on the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution 7 and federal civil rights legis"' See 648 F.2d at 927. The letter of recommendation sent by the Chief of Police to the
Director of Public Safety outlined his general evaluation of the past and potential performance of each candidate as well as the Chief's personal recommendations for promotion. See
id.

i12See id.
"3 See id. The Chief of Police, in his letter of recommendation, viewed Captain Talbert
very favorably and emphasized his abilities in the field. See id. The Chief of Police's letter
of recommendation specifically stated that he would have no qualms about recommending
Talbert for any future openings at the rank of Major. See id. Talbert received an evaluation
score of 39.5 from the personnel assessment center. See id.
' See id. The Chief of Police gave a moderately enthusiastic assessment of Captain
Miller's past performance. See id. The letter of recommendation emphasized that Miller's
current assignment as Acting-Major Inspector qualified him for promotion to that rank on a
permanent basis. See id. Additionally, the Chief of Police stated that the promotion of a
black officer to a high rank in the Richmond Police Force could have favorable consequences
in the racially divided city. See id. Richmond previously had not considered a black officer
for promotion to major and the Chief of Police stated that Miller had reached his present
position solely on his own merit. See id. Captain Miller received an evaluation score 5.5
points lower than that received by the plaintiff, a point differential not considered decisive
by the Chief of Police. See id. The letter of recommendation also erroneously referred to
Richmond's Affirmative Action plan as further justification for Miller's promotion. See id.
The City of Richmond has no Affirmative Action Plan setting out specific goals for minority
hiring or promotion. See id. n.1. Rather, the city has adopted an Equal Opportunity Plan
which calls for a general policy of non-discrimination in all aspects of city employment. See
id.
" See id. at 927.
"

See id.

"U.S.

CONST.

amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part

that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws:' Id. Jurists and commentators have debated whether the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended its protections to apply to all citizens or only the newly freed
slaves. Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,.293 (1978) (Powell, J.,
separate opinionY (framers thought fourteenth amendment to protect blacks); Butcher's
Benevolent Ass'n of New Orleans v. Crescent City Livestock Landing & Slaughterhouse Co.
(Slaughter-House Cases), 83 U.S. (16 Wall.), 36, 71 (1873) (pervading purpose of fourteenth
amendment to guarantee freedom of blacks); R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 18-19 (1977) (fourteenth amendment
designed to guarantee blacks limited set of fundamental rights); and Redish, Preferential
Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of the Competing
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lation.5 In his complaint, Talbert alleged not only that the city had violated
its constitutional duty not to discriminate against white officers, 19 but also
that the failure to promote the plaintiff resulted from retaliation for a
previous suit Talbert had brought against the city. 0 Talbert further
alleged that the preferential treatment inherent in the decision to promote Captain Miller violated the terms of a consent decree entered into
by the City of Richmond in a previous case of alleged discrimination involving the police department.2 Talbert sought a declaratory judgment
Arguments, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 343, 357 (1974) (fourteenth amendment enacted to benefit
freed slaves), with Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (fourteenth amendment
universal guarantee of equal protection) and Bickel, The Original Understandingand the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 60-63 (1955) (framers understood fourteenth
amendment to apply to all citizens). Despite the debate over the scope of the fourteenth
amendment's coverage, the Supreme Court has expanded the number of groups within the
amendment's purview. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-78 (1954) (MexicanAmericans protected); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1915) (Austrian resident aliens);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (Irish) (dictum).
" See 648 F.2d at 926. Talbert based his statutory claims on the civil rights guarantees
contained in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986, and 1988. See 648 F.2d at 926; 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1985(3), 1986, 1988 (1976). Section 1983, based on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat.
13, authorizes civil actions against any person acting under color of governmental authority,
who violates another person's civil and constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); see
Schacter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1978). See generally Brooks, Use of the
Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 to Redress Employment Discrimination,62 CORNELL L.
REV. 258 (1977). Section 1985, enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13,
authorizes civil suits against any two or more persons who conspire to violate the civil or
constitutional rights of another person. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976). Section 1985 creates no
new rights but serves only to remedy violations of other constitutionally guaranteed civil
rights. See Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 376 (1979).
See generally Note, The Scope of Section 1985(3) Since Griffin v. Breckenridge, 45 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 239 (1976). The guarantees contained in Section 1986 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, 17 Stat. 15, authorize civil actions against any person who, having the power to do
otherwise, neglects or refuses to prevent a conspiracy to violate civil rights guaranteed by
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976). 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1976). Section 1988 describes the nature and
governing laws of civil rights proceedings and authorizes discretionary grants of attorney's
fees in certain types of actions. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
19

See 648 F.2d at 926.

See Joint Appendix, supra note 10, at 9. Plaintiff Talbert had filed a previous suit
alleging reverse discrimination by the City of Richmond in its failure to promote him to the
rank of captain in 1975. See id. Talbert's prior reverse discrimination suit was settled
before trial by an agreement to promote Talbert to captain. See id. The constitutional and
statutory guarantees on which Talbert based his claims do not prohibit specifically retaliation for opposition to discrimination. See notes 17 & 18 supra;see also 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a)
(1976) (prohibiting employer retaliation for opposition to discrimination under Civil Rights
Act of 1964). Proof of purposeful retaliation could, however, provide evidence of the
discriminatory intent necessary to establish an equal protection violation. See Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976) (equal protection violation must entail discriminatory intent).
21 See Joint Appendix, supra note 10, at 10. In settlement of a discrimination suit initiated by black policemen, the city entered into a consent decree mandating that the police
force maintain an absolute non-discrimination policy in regard to police employment. See
Richmond Black Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Richmond, No. 74-0267-R (E.D. Va., July 3,
1975) (consent decree).
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that the city had violated his rights and an order permanently enjoining
the city from refusing to promote him to the rank of major.' Furthermore, the plaintiff sought an award of back pay and other benefits that
he would have received with the promotion, punitive damages, costs and
attorney's fees.'
The district court reviewed the relevant evidence but refused to
make any qualitative judgments regarding the relative abilities or
potential performance of the two officers. 4 Neither did the court discuss
Captain Miller's current assignment as Acting Major-Inspector.' Instead, the trial court focused on the scores the two men received from
the personnel assessment center, assuming that these scores had valid
predictive ability.' Although recognizing the value that a black man in a
high police position could have in a city with a population approximately
one-half black, the court nevertheless found that the city based the decision not to promote Captain Talbert solely on the basis of raceY Finding
a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights, the district court ruled
in favor of Talbert.' Since the court found that the city had violated the
plaintiff's constitutional rights, the district judge found it unnecessary
to determine the statutory claims raised by Talbert.'
On appeal of the constitutional issues decided below, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's holding." The appellant city argued
that the case was controlled by Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of
the University of Californiav. Bakke."1 In Bakke, the plaintiff contended
that a special admissions program, that reserved 16% of the available
positions in the entering class of the University of California at Davis
Medical School for minority applicants, 2 violated Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 19641 and the fourteenth amendment.34 The medical school
I See 648 F.2d at 926. Subsequent to the instigation of his suit against the City of
Richmond, plaintiff Talbert received promotion to the rank of Major. See id. at 929. Talbert
maintained his suit against Richmond despite his promotion to Major. See id. at 926.
1 See id. at 927. Talbert demanded $25,000 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in
punitive damages. See Joint Appendix, supra note 10, at 12.
2 See 648 F.2d at 927. The district court did not issue a written opinion, only findings
of fact and conclusions of law.
" See id.
See id.
" See id. at 927-28. See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318
(1978) (Powell, J., separate opinion) (constitution forbids foreclosing opportunities solely on
basis of applicant's race); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1144 (8th Cir. 1981)
(employer may not base hiring decision solely on race of applicant).
See 648 F.2d at 928.
See id.; note 18 supra.
Id. at 926.
3' See id. at 928; 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J., separate opinion).
See 438 U.S. 265, 272-77 (1978) (Powell, J., separate opinion).
42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids
discriminatory acts by organizations receiving any federal funding. Id.
I See 438 U.S. at 277-78; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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twice rejected the application of the plaintiff, a white male,5 even
though his ratings, based on the general criteria employed by the school,
exceeded those of some minority applicants accepted under the special
admissions program. 6 The Supreme Court, in Bakke, issued several
fragmented and confused opinions,37 which left unclear the legal status of
reversed discrimination.3 8 Although the Talbert court found numerous
distinguishing features which separated Talbert and Bakke,39 the Fourth
Circuit ruled that the similarity of the appellant city's arguments to
Justice Powell's analysis justified reliance on Justice Powell's Bakke opinion.40
In analyzing the various issues raised in Bakke, Justice Powell held
that any classification based on race was inherently suspect 4 and subject
See 438 U.S. at 276.
See id. at 276-77. The medical school admissions committee involved in Bakke
evaluated applicants in terms of their undergraduate grade point averages, placing emphasis on grades received in science courses. See id. at 273-74. The admissions committee
further considered the applicant's score on the Medical College Admissions Test, letters of
recommendation, and participation in extra-curricular activities. See id. Plaintiff Bakke had
an overall grade point average approximately one point higher than the average student accepted under the special admissions program and significantly higher scores on his medical
school boards than the minority students accepted to the medical school. See id. at 277 n.7.
See 438 U.S. at 269-324 (Powell, J., announcing decision of court and separate opinion); id. at 324-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, J J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (preferential admissions constitutional to remedy past discrimination); id. at
379-87 (White, J., separate opinion) (addressing only private right of action under Title VI);
id. at 387-402 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (history of black subjugation demands preferential treatment); id. at 402-08 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (university has special need to consider race); id. at 408-21 (Stevens, Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist, J
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (statutory, not constitutional, grounds control
case). This spider's-web of opinions resulted in an order requiring the admission of the plaintiff although no majority of the Justices agreed on the basis of this result. See id. at 271
(Powell, J., separate opinion).
The Court has refused to adopt any of the rationales set out in the various Bakke opinions. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980). See also Blasi, Bakke as Precedent
Does Mr. JusticePowell Have a Theory?, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 21, 21 (1979) (Bakke court failed
to give clear meaning to constitutional guarantees); Morris, The Bakke Decision: One
Holding or Two?, 58 ORE. L. REV. 311, 334 (1979) (Bakke decision so fragmented as to have
no precedential value). See generally Voros, Three Views of EqualProtection A Backdrop
to Bakke, 1979 B.Y.U.L. REV. 25 (1979).
See generally Bell, Introduction. Awakening After Bakke, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bell]; McCormack, Race and Politics In the Supreme
Court: Bakke to Basics, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 491.
" See 648 F.2d at 928. The Talbert court found that in the instant case, unlike Bakke,
there existed no explicit policy adopted by the defendant authorizing racial quotas or exclusionary policies. See id. Furthermore, the City of Richmond, unlike the University of
California medical school, did not base the challenged decision on a desire to remedy past
discrimination. See id.
, See id. at 928-29.
See 438 U.S. at 291 (Powell, J., separate opinion), quoting Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (laws aimed at one racial group "immediately suspect");
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (racial distinctions inherently repugnant and suspect).
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to the strictest judicial scrutiny.42 Justice Powell would accept raceconscious remedial efforts initiated after specific findings by a competent judicial, legislative, or administrative body that discrimination had
occurred in the past.4 3 Although Justice Powell wrote that race may not
See 438 U.S. at 291 (Powell, J., separate opinion). The Supreme Court has recognized
two types of judicial scrutiny applicable to equal protection cases. If the classification in
question relies on racial criteria the case merits strict scrutiny. See Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (alloving racial classification for national security); United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (Stone, J., concurring) (first expression of strict scrutiny standard). Under the strict scrutiny test, the government must
show that a compelling state interest demands the suspect classification. See In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). Strict scrutiny also applies to governmental
actions which infringe on fundamental liberties. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Moseley, 408
U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (statute limiting first amendment right demands strict scrutiny); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971) (strict Scrutiny for laws restricting right to travel);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969) (property limitation on right
to vote requires strict scrutiny). For a law infringing citizens' rights to receive strict
scrutiny, the asserted right must explicitly or impliedly derive from the Constitution. See
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411'U.S. 1, 30-35 (1973) (right to equal
education not constitutionally based); but see id. at 100 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (certain
non-constitutional rights deserve strict scrutiny).
If the governmental action challenged on equal protection grounds does not entail a
suspect classification or infringe on fundamental liberties, the courts only will require that
the challenged classification bear a "rational relation" to the legitimate desired goal. See
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); R.E.A. Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
110 (1949). Since the Court does not desire to usurp. the legislative function of determining
the efficacy of the chosen means of reaching a legitimate goal, government actions will pass
the rational relation test if any possible justification exists for a challenged decision. See id.
at 126. See generally Comment, Reverse Discrimination:The Balancing of Human Rights,
12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 852, 855-58 (1976).
Despite the Supreme Court's insistence that only two levels of scrutiny exist for equal
protection analysis, some cases have turned on an intermediate level of scrutiny which
balances the importance of the interest sought and the invidiousness of the basis of the
challenged classification. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173
(1972) (recognizing intermediate standard for laws penalizing illegitimacy); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (recognizing intermediate standard for sex discrimination claims).
Justice Marshall has stated that a sliding-scale of review incorporating the intermediate
level of scrutiny would provide the courts greater flexibility in all equal protection matters.
See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 124 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); but see id. at 31 (sliding scale of review would allow courts to usurp legislative
function). One commentator has suggested that an intermediate level of review is appropriate in reverse discrimination cases, given- the unique nature of such litigation. See
Greenawalt, JudicialScrutiny of "Benign"Racial PreferencesIn Law School Admissions,
in REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 219 (B. Gross, ed. 1977) (reverse discrimination claims demand

analysis weighing government interest against non-racial means of achieving same result)
[hereinafter cited as Greenawalt]; text accompanying notes 95 & 96 infra.
"sSee 438 U.S. at 307 (Powell, J., separate opinion). Justice Powell in Bakke held that
specific findings by a competent government body could serve as the basis of a compelling
state interest allowing the use of racial criteria. See id. at 307-09; note 42 supra.See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367-76 (1977) (judicial determination of past discriminatory employment practices justifies imposition of racially
oriented remedial action); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 155-56 (1977)
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serve as a sole basis for classifying an individual,"' he ruled that the interest of a university in achieving a diverse student body is sufficiently
compelling to allow race to serve as one consideration in an admissions
process.45 Allowing race to serve as one factor among many considered in
evaluating an individual applicant meets Justice Powell's criteria of constitutionality unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that discriminatory intent actually motivated a racially oriented selection process.48
Accepting the city's proposition that the promotional decision at
issue in Talbert only considered the candidates' race as one factor in the
overall assessment process, the Fourth Circuit proceeded through the
analysis Bakke established to determine if an invidiously discriminatory
purpose underlay the supposedly non-discriminatory decision." A
Supreme Court case prior to Bakke set forth the criteria for determining
the existence of invidious discrimination in equal protection litigation. 8
Following this analysis, a court searches for discriminatory intent by ex(past discrimination finding by legislature justifies electoral redistricting to increase black
voting strength); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)
(court may order busing of school children to remedy past discrimination); see generally
Dixon, Bakke: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 69 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Dixon].
" See 438 U.S. at 318.
" See 438 U.S. at 314-15 (Powell, J., separate opinion). In Bakke, Justice Powell wrote
that the compelling interest of a diverse student body necessitated some form of racial
classification. See id. at 315. A suspect classification will pass the strict scrutiny test if
necessary to the achievement of a compelling state goal. See In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717,
721-22 (1973); note 42 supra.See also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (diverse student body in law school important state interest).
" See 438 U.S. at 289 n.27 (Powell, J., separate opinion), citing Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 242 (1976).
" See 648 F.2d at 929-31; 438 U.S. at 318-19 (Powell, J., separate opinion); see also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 547-49 (1972) (discriminatory intent necessary for equal protection claim). During the 1960's and 1970's, the Supreme Court issued a number of opinions
which seemed to demand only evidence of a disproportionate racial impact, rather than a
discriminatory intent, in order to establish an equal protection claim. See, e.g., Wright v. City
of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1972) (discriminatory motive irrelevant); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (court will not invalidate law on basis of bad motive); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384-85 (1968) (effect, not motive, key to equal protection
claim); see generally Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of RacialDiscrimination,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977). In 1976, however, the Court ruled that a plaintiff must prove
discriminatory intent to challenge a government action not discriminatory on its face. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976). The requirement of intent arose from
judicial fear that a simple impact requirement would invalidate innumerable valid measures
which tended to overly burden minority groups, such as regressive bridge tolls and sales
taxes. See id at 248. See generally Note, DiscriminatoryPurpose: What It Means Under
the Equal Protection Clause- Washington v. Davis, 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 650 (1977).
See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); see
generally Schwemm, From Washington To Arlington Heights and Beyond- Discriminatory
Purpose In Equal ProtectionLitigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Schwemm]; Comment, A Last Stand On Arlington Heights: Title VIII and the Requirement
of DiscriminatoryIntent, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (1978).
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amining the impact of the challenged decision on a racial group, the.
historical background of the controversy, deviations from normal procedural or substantive norms, and the statements of the officials charged
with discrimination. ' 9
In examining these four factors, the Talbert court initially noted
that the failure to promote the plaintiff had no disproportionate impact
on the plaintiffs race as a whole. 0 Two other white officers had received
appointments to the rank of major at the time of the alleged violation of
the plaintiffs 'rights."' Furthermore, only white officers, including
Talbert, had received promotions to major subsequent to the promotion
of Captain Miller,5 2 thereby evidencing the slight impact the decision not
to promote the plaintiff had on other whites. The court admitted that the
decision to promote the black captain had an impact on the plaintiff as an
individual,O but discounted the weight of this racial impact in determining the existence of discriminatory intent."
The court next examined the historical background of the alleged
violation.5 The Talbert court initially considered the effect of a consent
decree previously entered into by the City of Richmond in another controversy involving the police department. 6 In that decree, the city, while
not explicitly admitting discriminatory practices, agreed to a policy of
employment without regard to race. The Fourth Circuit observed that
the city government had made a conscientious effort to remove obstacles
that blocked the progress of black officers.' The court also noted that
the city did not have a history of discriminating against white policemen. 9 The court cited no concrete evidence, other than the consent
See 429 U.S. at 266-68, 648 F.2d at 929.
See 648 F.2d at 929. The A'rlington Heights court tended to denigrate the importance of racial impact. See 429 U.S. at 266. In an extremely blatant case, however, where
racial animosity constitutes the only feasible explanation for clearly disproportionate impact on one race the disproportionate impact may serve as the sole basis of discriminatory
intent. See id; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960) (redistricting almost totally eliminating blacks from electoral district shows intent to discriminate); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (consistent discretionary decisions against Chinese un"

constitutional).
51

See 648 F.2d at 929.
See &

"See id.
" See idL, quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977) (impact not dispositive).
See 648 F.2d at 929-30.
See id.; Richmond Black Police Officers' Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 74-0267-R (E.D.
Va., July 3, 1975) (consent decree); note 21 supra.
, See 648 F.2d at 930.
See id. The Talbert court's finding that the city consciously removed stumbling blocks to black progress undercuts the findings -of past non-discrimination in police
employment and lack of remedial intent on the part of the city. See id.; note 39 supra.
' See 648 F.2d at 930.
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decree of 1975, to support its generalized findings of non-discrimination
in the recent history of the Richmond police force."0
The Talbert court then examined the trial record for deviations in
procedure or departures from regular substantive criteria that may
have distinguished this controversy from other promotions and thereby
revealed discriminatory intent." The record showed that the scores
given the candidates by the personnel assessment center merely qualified them for the, promotion eligibility list and did not serve as the sole
basis of promotion.2 The court assumed that the lack of specific instruction given to Richmond police officials concerning any predictive insight
of the assessment center's evaluations 6 undercut the significance of the
candidates' rankings on the eligibility list.64 Trial testimony of the Director of Public Safety that the testing scores did not determine his promotional choices re-enforced the court's finding that the city based its promotions on a number of factors unrelated to the candidates' numerical
rankings. 5 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that no previous promotion
had gone to a candidate with a score more than one point lower than
another, unpromoted, candidate.66 The- court found, however, that the
departure from normal substantive criteria utilized for police promotions was unsubstantial. 7 Rather than delineate any previous or possible
standards for evaluating candidates for high police rank, the Talbert
court deferred to the city officials' pronouncements that Captain Miller's
qualifications justified his promotion. 6 Furthermore, unlike the district
' See id&at 929-30. In contrast to the longer period of history examined by the Talbert
court, the Arlington Heights Court concentrated on the time immediately preceeding the
challenged government action. See 429 U.S. at 269-70; 648 F.2d at 929-30. In Arlington
Heights, the plaintiff challenged the denial of a re-zoning request which would have led to
the construction of an integrated low-income housing development in a predominately white
suburb of Chicago. See 429 U.S. at 254-59. By focusing on the period just before the beginning of the Arlington Heights controversy, the Supreme Court ignored the long-term patterns of housing that characterized the Village of Arlington Heights. See id at 269-70. A
more wide-ranging inquiry into the historical background of housing patterns in the Arlington Heights case could lead to an inference of continuing discriminatory intent as an
underlying basis for the challenged decision. See Schwemm, supra note 48, at 1026.
61 See 648 F.2d at 930-31.
See id. at 930. The Talbert court noted that strict reliance on the candidates' rankings from the personnel assessment center would frustrate the requirement from the city
charter that the number of candidates considered equal five more than the number of vacancies. See id. at 931; note 8 supra.
See 648 F.2d at 930.
See id. A consultant associated with the Richmond personnel assessment center
testified at trial that, although candidates' rankings did indicate some differential in
abilities, he would not recommend that the candidates' scores constitute the sole basis of a
promotion decision. See id. n.2.
See id. at 930.
66 See id. Captain Talbert received a score 5.5 points higher than that received by Captain Miller. See id. at 927; text accompanying notes 13 & 14 supra.
67 See 648 F.2d at 930-31.
See id. at 931; note 14 supra.
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court, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that Captain Miller had served as
Acting Major Inspector for over a year and therefore, had actual experience in the position. 9 The court inferred from the discussions of experience contained in the letter of recommendation written by the Chief of
Police proved that Richmond's normal promotion procedure took experience into account.70
The Talbert court proceeded to examine the fourth factor called for
by the Supreme Court, the administrative history of the challenged decision, as expressed by the contemporaneous statements of the officials involved.71 In Talbert, the administrative history consisted solely of the
contents of the letter of recommendation from the Chief of Police.2 The
letter and merely noted the contents
Fourth Circuit did not analyze the
73
without drawing any conclusions.
Having proceeded through the examination called for by the
Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit determined that although the city officials had considered Miller's race, the city had pursued a legitimate interest and not the illegitimate purpose of invidious discrimination.74 The
legitimate end sought by the city entailed the practical needs of a police
force serving a racially diverse city.75 The court accepted the city's proposition that the effective and efficient execution of a police department's
duties demands the public support created by an integrated police
department.76 This recognition of the legitimacy of taking race into con69 See id.

" See id. The Talbert court did not specify what might have constituted sufficient procedural deviation to justify an inference of discriminatory intent. See id. See also Arthur v.
Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978) (procedural deviation
giving white students easy ability to transfer to different schools implies discriminatory intent); Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243, 253-54 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (intent to segregate schools inferred from sudden change in attendance zones); see generally
Note, Proving DiscriminatoryIntent From a FaciallyNeutralDecision With a Disproportionate Impact, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Disproportionate
Impact].
1' See 648 F.2d at 931. The Arlington Heights court found contemporaneous
statements of the officials involved in the challenged decision particularly probative of intent, although testimony about such statements by legislative officials would often prove
unavailable because of the separation of powers doctrine. See 429 U.S. at 268.
" See 648 F.2d at 931; notes 13 & 14 supra.
"s See id
" See id.
75See id.; text accompanying note 27 supra.
7 See id. See also Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 695-96 (6th Cir.1979) (effective police need community support generated by integrated police force). See
generally Note; Race as an Employment Qualification to Meet Police Department OperationalNeeds, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 413, 413-15 (1979) (racially diverse police force serves urban
needs). Commentators have recognized that segregated police departments breed distrust
and hostility among minority groups. See, e.g., NATIONAL ADvISORY-COMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDERS Report 9-11, 205 (New York Times ed. 1978) (blacks resent segregated police as
symbol of white power structure); J. AHERN, POLICE IN TROUBLE: OUR FRIGHTENING CRIsIs
IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 30 (1972) (white police express racist attitudes); GOVERNOR'S SELECT
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sideration in connection with the promotion of an individual further
negated any inference of invidiously discriminatory intent. Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit decided to reverse the trial court and remand the
case for entry of a judgment in favor of the defendant."
Although arguably reaching a desirable result, the Talbert opinion
and its application of the discriminatory intent requirement merit
criticism for both the method of application employed in the instant case
and the inappropriateness of the intent test in any reverse discrimination controversy. The Fourth Circuit stated that the failure to promote
one white individual had no adverse impact on the white race as a
whole.78 The impact standard employed by the Talbert court evolved
from a case involving governmental action which adversely affected the
rights of a class of citizens who historically suffered discrimination.79 A
simplistic conclusion that disparate treatment affecting only one individual does not burden his race ignores both the plaintiffs rights as an
individual and the injury which may occur to the victim regardless of the
absence of adverse impact on his class." The historical investigation of
the Talbert case similarly is unenlightening. The Fourth Circuit gave a
cursory examination to Richmond's prior racial practices and found no
previous policies aimed at discriminating against white policemen. 1
Such evidence will never exist, however, as most people are not discriminatorily disposed against members of their own race.2 The obvious function of an historical analysis of this type is to identify current
discriminatory actions based on long-held antipathy toward members of
minority groups. The statement that white Americans have not suffered
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDER, STATE OF NEw JERSEY REPORT FOR ACTION

22-36 (1968)

(white police hostile to black interests). Police efficiency should not, however, overwhelm all
other considerations. See Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294, 300 (5th Cir. 1968)
(police efficiency does not outweigh constitutional rights).
" See 648 F.2d at 931-32. Although the Talbert court did not spell out the level of
scrutiny used, the plaintiff's failure to establish discriminatory intent seems to have entitled
the case to review under the lenient rational relation test. See note 42 supra. Under the rational relation analysis, a non-suspect classification will meet judicial approval if the
classification might achieve a legitimate government objective. See McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); note 42 supra.
8 See 648 F.2d at 929; text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254-58
(1977) (denial of rezoning affected blacks).
I See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 529 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (equal
protection is personal, not racial, right); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
299 (1978) IPowell, J., separate opinion) (equal protection individual right); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (fourteenth amendment guarantees personal rights).
" See 648 F.2d at 929-30.
See Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Racial Discrimination,41 U. CHI. L. REV.
723, 735 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ely]; but see Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 503
(1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (minorities develop negative self-image based on racial
stereotypes; G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 150-54 (1954); G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER,
RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORITIES 192-95, 227, 295 (4th ed. 1972).
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past discrimination adds nothing to the inquiry involved in a reverse
discrimination case. In fact, a broad historical review, as in the Talbert
opinion,n will merely establish that the white majority consistently has
dominated American society. Given the recent development of the reverse discrimination dilemma84 a more relevant inquiry would focus on recent history and any evidence of other preferential treatment of minority groups. This type of examination would expose actual intent to
discriminate on the grounds of race.
The Fourth Circuit's examination of the procedural history and contemporaneous comments involved in Talbert points out the inherent difficulties of divining underlying motive from the sketchy information
available on after-the-fact review."5 Absent detailed guidelines setting
out specific procedure, differentiation between a valid exercise of
government discretion and a decision which violates an individual's constitutional rights will prove nearly impossible. In Talbert, the final promotion decisions of the Richmond police force did not follow any specific
guidelines. 8 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit had nothing to compare the
challenged promotion decision against except the testimony of the city
officials that the circumstances warranted the promotion of the black officer. Also, contemporaneous statements seldom will produce probative
evidence of discrimination if decisionmakers couch their words in
neutral tones.88
Given the low probability that those implementing decisions having
a reverse discrimination effect will harbor antipathy to whites,89 the
search for statements indicative of prejudicial attitude becomes
pointless. In essence, reverse discrimination controversies do not present a mirror image of more traditional forms of discrimination, where
racial bigotry underlies a denial of constitutional rights. Preferential
treatment for the disadvantaged entails no inherent desire to damage
the dominant majority. The preferential treatment of minorities does,
however, damage the individual. Therefore, by requiring a showing of
discriminatory intent on the part of the defendant, the Fourth Circuit effectively foreclosed any chance of success by a claimant alleging reverse
discrimination.
See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
u See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
See 648 F.2d at 929-32; text accompanying notes 55-73 supra; see generally Brest,
Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT.
REV. 95 (1971); Ely, Legislative-and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79
YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
" See 648 F.2d at 927-29; text accompanying notes 7-11 supra.
See 648 F.2d at 930. Cf. Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1040 (10th Cir. 1970)
(comparing denial of rezoning with previous zoning requests in area).
See DisproportionateImpact, supra note 70, at 123; but see Griffin v. School Bd. of
Prince Edward Co., 377 U.S. 218, 222 (1964) (express statement of discriminatory intent present).
" See text accompanying note 82 supra.
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On a broader level, one may criticize the intent requirement in any
equal protection litigation. Themassive difficulties involved in ascertaining subjective discriminatory intent will present a substantial barrier to
many equal protection claims." The guiding principle in equal protection
cases remains similar treatment for similarly situated citizens." Since
the injury to constitutional rights remains constant whether occasioned
by discrimination, remedial intent, or mere insensitivity to inevitable
results,92 a better standard would hold decisionmakers responsible for
the foreseeable consequences of their actions. 3 If a decision leads to an
obvious result the courts should look to the consequnces of that result
and the countervailing circumstances rather than the ill-defined purpose
initially prompting the chosen course of action. 4 The discriminatory effect of a personally prejudicial decision, remains, regardless of the
possibility that a court may find an underlying bad intent. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has rejected any approach prohibiting government action with foreseeably discriminatory consequences absent a
showing of discriminatory intent.95
In connection with the entire reverse discrimination controversy,
the difficulties involved in ascertaining discrimintory intent point to the
necessity of developing more flexible levels of review for evaluating new
forms of racial classifications. Rather than maintaining formalistic
distinctions betweep compelling and merely legitimate governmental interests," the Supreme Court should adopt a sliding scale of review which
would weigh the interest sought against the injury suffered. Although

o See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1031 (1978).
9' See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting, Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
92 See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom, Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (1969) (government thoughtlessness injures as easily as discriminatory
intent); see also Dixon, supra note 43, at 85 (lack of stigmatization of reverse discrimination
victims does not alleviate practical injury).
" See Sellers, The Impact of Intent on Equal ProtectionJurisprudence,84 DICK. L.
REv. 363, 373-74 (1980).

" See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J.; concurring) (extremely
difficult to prove subjective intent of decision maker); Note, DiscriminatoryPurpose: What
It Means Under the EqualProtectionClause: Washington v. Davis, 26 DE PAUL L. REv. 650,
660 (1977).
" See Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672, 672-73 (1977). The Supreme Court fears
that a foreseeable consequences approach would invalidate many essential, but foreseeably
discriminatory, government actions, such as the imposition of regressive sales taxes. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976); note 47 supra;see generally Note, Reading
the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/DeJureDistinclign, 86
YALE L.J. 317, 328-32 (1976) (rejecting foreseeable consequences standard).
See note 42 supra.
See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (calling for sliding scale of review in equal protection cases); note 42 supra;
see generally Greenawalt, supra note 42, at 219.
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such inquiries are very subjective and prone to manipulation," an intermediate level of review would allow a fairer and more open method of
evaluating attempts to enhance the status of minorities. In Talbert, such
a review would pit the benefits to the community arising from an integrated police force and the individual qualities of Captain Miller
against the injury received by Captain Talbert as a result of the city's
consideration of the candidates' race. However, given the court's
recognition of the importance of an integrated police force99 and
Talbert's subsequent promotion to major,' 0 the outcome of the case
would not have differed.
The Talbert case presents an uncommon form of reverse discrimination litigation. The large majority of reverse discrimination claims arise
in connection with specific Affirmative Action Programs called for
preferential treatment of minorities.' 1 The Talbert case, nonetheless,
does evidence the confusion that exists in reverse discrimination litigation.0 2
The arguments for and against preferential treatment for minorities
are many and varied.' 3 Proponents stress our nation's history of racial
hatred' 4 and the necessity of forcefully remedying the current effects of
past discrimination.' 5 Also, some argue that only by taking race into account can we ever reach a non-racially oriented society.' 0 Other critics
, See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31 (1973) (sliding scale of
review makes court superlegislature with improper policy making power); see generally
Areen & Ross, The Rodriguez Case: Judicial Oversight of School Finance, 1973 SuP. CT.
REv. 33 (1973); The Supreme Court4 1972 Term-Equal Protection-LocalProperty Taxes
as a Means of FinancingPublic Schools, 87 HARv.L. REv. 105 (1973).
See 648 F.2d at 931; text accompanying notes 73 & 74 supra.
' See 648 F.2d at 929; note 22 supra.
"' See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979) (approving voluntarily adopted Affirmative Action program); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v.
Young, 608 F.2d 671, 694 (6th Cir. 1979) (allowing Affirmative Action Plan in police employment); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053,1055 (5th Cir. 1974) (creating hiring quotas for state
police after findings of past discrimination); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (endorsing judicially created hiring quotas); see also
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (Powell, J., separate opinion)
(approving racial classifications after findings of past discrimination by competent judicial,
legislative, or administrative bodies).
,oSee 648 F.2d at 926-32; text accompanying notes 37-38 & 46 supra.
See generally Note, Reverse Discrimination-ASummary of the Arguments With
FurtherConsiderationof its Stigmatizing Effect, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 421 (1977).
"' See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 390 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (history of black subjugation demands remedial efforts); id. at 355-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, J J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (government has compelling interest in remedying past discrimination).
,..
See M. KING, WHY WE CAN'r WAIT 147 (1964) (equal opportunity achievable only
after remedying past discrimination).
",E.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 516 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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complain that reverse discrimination encourages racial thinking"7 and
perpetuates stereotypes of inferiority." 8 Some also argue that preferential treatment of minorities could also lead to a discriminatory
backlash,0 9 eradicating many of the advances made in civil rights in the
last quarter century."0 More fundamentally, reverse discrimination
undercuts the basic presumption that race is irrelevant in connection
with equal treatment under the law."' The question of the ultimate
benefits and disadvantages of benign racial preference remains in flux.
The Supreme Court must set forth more definitive guidelines on the
proper weight which decisionmakers can afford race in an individual
assessment and selection process. The Court has failed to adopt specifically any of the rationales put forth by the Bakke opinions."' The Circuit
Courts remains divided on their conceptions of the relevance of race to
proper government interests."' Absent clearer guidance from the
Supreme Court, decisions such as Talbert, which relied on illogical requirements of discriminatory intent, will continue the uncertainty and
indecision which mark reverse discrimination litigation."
H.

DAVID NATKIN

10.See 448 U.S. at 532 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (reverse discrimination encourages

racial categorization and stereotypes); Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage:Race, the Supreme
Court and the Constitution, 46 U. CHi. L. REV. 775, 778 (1979) (reverse discrimination erases
progress toward nonracial attitudes).
1" See De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(preferential treatment brands minorities as inferior); Bell, supra note 38, at 4 (reverse
discrimination entails group defamation).
"0 See Ely, supra note 82, at 736-37 (reverse discrimination leads to resentment of
preferred minorities).
"' See id. at 738-39.
.. See Anderson v. Maryland, 375 U.S. 399, 403 (1964) (race constitutionally irrelevant);
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Constitution properly
color-blind).
112See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (refusing to adopt any of the
Bakke opinions). Justice Powell's vote in Bakke did swing the decision in favor of compelling
the admission of the plaintiff and may, therefore, have some precedential value. See Smith,
The Road Not Taken: More Reflections On the Bakke Case, 5 S.L. REv. 23, 47-48 (1978). A
single Justice, without majority support, cannot, however, announce any central meaning to
a decision. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408 n.1 (1978) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see generally Comment, Supreme Court NoClear Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (1976).
"I Compare Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 694 (6th Cir. 1979)
(allowing reverse discrimination for purely remedial reasons) with Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 928-29 (1981) (adopting Powell rationale from Bakke limiting remedial
acts) and Associated Gen'l Contractors of Cal. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 616
F.2d 1381, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1981) (no constitutional duty to
favor minorities).
I" See Karst & Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 7 (1979) (courts have not faced reverse discrimination issue
squarely).
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Protectionof Religious Group Members Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c)

Section 1985(c) of Title 42 of the United States Code' provides a civil
remedy for damages against any person who conspires to deprive another
of equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under
the laws.2 Recently section 1985(c) has come under the scrutiny of the
federal courts as a vehicle for an increasing number of federal claims,3
1 42

U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976). Section 1985(c) was originally enacted as part of the Civil

Rights Act of 1871 (1871 Act). See Note, Remedies for Statutory Violations Under Sections
1983 and 1985(c), 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 309, 309 n.2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Remedies].
Section 5 ofthe fourteenth amendment-gives Congress power to enact legislation to prevent
denial of equal rights on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV § 5. See Lippe, The Uneasy Partnership:The Balance of Power Between Congress and the Supreme Court in Interpretationof the Civil War Amendments, 7
AKRON L. REV. 49, 49 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Lippe]. The Reconstruction era Congress
passed the 1871 Act pursuant to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment to guarantee a forum
where citizens could secure their federal rights. See Remedies, supra, at 321. The goal of
the fourteenth amendment is to guarantee that no person be denied his rights on the basis
of race. See, Lippe, supra, at 49-66. See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil
Rights Legislation,50 MIcH. L. REV. 1323, 1323-36 (1952). Congress intended the 1871 Act to
prevent southern states from denying newly freed slaves their fourteenth amendment
rights. See Note, The ProperScope of the Civil Rights Act, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1285-86
(1953). The 1976 edition of the United States Code redesignated § 1985(3) as § 1985(c). See 42
U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976). This article will refer to the section as § 1985(c).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976). Justices Powell and Stevens have argued in separate concurring opinions that § 1985(c) protects only violations of fundamental rights derived from
the Constitution and does not protect statutory rights. See Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378-85 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring and
Stevens, J., concurring). The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Great American Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n, however, deliberately sidestepped the issue whether § 1985(c)
creates a remedy for statutory rights other than rights derived from the Constitution. See
id. at 370 n.6. Justice Powell criticized the majority in his concurring opinion for leaving
federal courts in doubt regarding the scope of actions under § 1985(c), and would have made
clear that § 1985(c) provides a remedy only for conspiracies which violate fundamental
rights derived from the Constitution. See id. at 379, 381 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens expressed his belief that § 1985(c) was not intended to provide a remedy for the
violation of statutory rights. See id.at 385 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens argued
that to hold otherwise would extend the scope of § 1985(c) to cover all rights arising from existing statutes. See id. Justice Stevens noted that private discrimination on the basis of sex
is not prohibited by the Constitution, but rather is prohibited by a statute enacted almost a
century after § 1985(c) was enacted. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) (unlawful to
discriminate on the basis of sex). In dissent Justice White argued that § 1985(c) encompasses
all rights guaranteed in federal statutes as well as rights guaranteed directly by the Constitution. See 442 U.S. at 388-89, n.5 (White, J., dissenting). Some lower courts have held
that § 1985(c) protects statutory rights. See McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 526
F.2d 870, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1976), modified, 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en bane) (§ 1985(c) protects statutory right to vote in Indian tribal elections). See generally Note, The Scope of
Section 1985() Since Griffin v. Breckenridge, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239, 243-44 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Scope of Section 1985(3)]; Remedies, supra note 1, at 314-20.
3 See Note, The Class-Based Animus Requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c): A SuggestedApproach, 64 MINN. L. REV. 635, 636 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Class-BasedAnimus
Requirement]. No reported cases arose under § 1985(c) or its predecessor statute from the
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forcing courts to reexamine its intended scope.4 In Griffin v. Breckenridge5 the United States Supreme Court determined the scope of the
rights section 1985(c) protects.' The Griffin Court held that private conspiracies to interfere with civil rights motivated by racial animus were
actionable under section 1985(c).1 The Court, however, explicitly declined
to decide whether- section 1985(c) prohibited private conspiracies
motivated by discriminatory intent other than racial bias.' Since Griffin
did not outline the section's permissible constitutional bounds,9 lower
courts interpreting Griffin have demonstrated confusion regarding the
scope of the rights and classes protected by section 1985(c). '° In Ward v.
Connor" the Fourth Circuit examined whether section 1985(c) protects
the right of free religious association and membership in a particular
religious sect.'2
date of the statute's enactment in 1871 until 1920. See id. at 636 n.6; Comment, The Civil
Rights Act: Emergence of An Adequate FederalCivilRemedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361,363 (1951).
By contrast, the 1974 edition of the United States Code Annotated and its 1980 supplement
list under § 1985, 142 pages of case citations. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 (1974 & 1980 Supp.).
Many of these cases involved § 1985(c) actions. See id. See generally Scope of Section
1985(3), supra note 2, at 240-42; Class-Based Animus Requirement, supra, at 636-38;
Remedies, supra note 1, at 309.
' See note 65 infra. See generally Scope of Section 1985(3), supra note 2,at 252-56;
Class-Based Animus Requirement, supra note 3, at 638-39.
403 U.S. 88 (1971).
See id. at 93.
See id. at 102-03. In Griffin v. Breckenridge the Supreme Court enumerated the
elements that § 1985(c) explicitly requires in a complaint. See id. The complaint must allege
a conspiracy to deprive a person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, or equal
privileges and immunities under the laws. See id. Moreover, the conspirators must commit
an act furthering the object of the conspiracy, and the plaintiff must sustain injury to his
person or property, or be deprived of a right or privilege of a United States citizen. See id.
See also Comment, Constitutional and JurisdictionalProblems in the Application of 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3), 52 B.U. L. REV. 599, 601-02 (1972); Comment, The Deprogramming of
Religious Sect Members: A Private Right of Action Under Section 1985(3), 74 Nw. U. L.
REV. 229, 233-34 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Deprogramming of Religious Sect Members];
note 30 infra. Griffin established that a § 1985(c) claim for relief must include facts supporting an allegation that defendants agreed to act in concert and committed an act in furtherance of this agreement. See 403 U.S. at 102-03. Lower courts have dismissed § 1985(c)
claims solely for failure to allege in the complaint sufficient supporting facts. See Droysen v.
Hansen, 59 F.R.D. 483, 484 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (conclusory allegations of conspiracy without
any specification of agreement forming conspiracy are insufficient); El Mundo, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico Newspaper Guild Local 225, 346 F. Supp. 106, 113 (D.P.R. 1972) (pleading of conclusory
allegations insufficient). Additionally, the Griffin Court required the complaint show some
racial, or otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators'
action, and identify congressional power to justify extending § 1983(c) to cover the alleged
private conspiracy. See 403 U.S. at 102, 104-06; text accompanying notes 30 & 31 infra.
403 U.S. at 102 n.9.
See 403 U.S. at 107.
, See text accompanying note 69 infra.
" 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1982)
(81-751).
" See id at 46-47.
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Ward is a member of the Unification Church' 3 and a follower of
Reverend Sun Myung Moon, the Church's founder and leader." In 1978
Ward's parents convinced him to travel from New York City to his
sister's home in Virginia Beach, Virginia for Thanksgiving dinner. ' - On
the day after Thanksgiving instead of being driven to the airport for his
return flight to New York, Ward was taken to and forcibly detained in
the home of an acquaintance of Ward's family.'" Ward's parents,
relatives; and others moved Ward to a motel in Norfolk, Virginia, then to
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania." Ward's family and family friends held him
captive for thirty-five days and subjected him to verbal and physical
abuse designed to "deprogram"18 him from his devotion to the Unification Church and Reverend Moon." The deprogrammers attempts to perSee id. at 46. The Internal Revenue Service recognizes The Spirit Association for
the Unification of World Christianity (Unification Church) as an organized religion. See
Gillis, Reverend Sun Myung Moon: "HeavenlyDeception"?,12 TRIAL 22,25 (Aug. 1976). The
Unification Church claims to have 30,000 followers in the United States. See id.at 24. The
Unification Church has described itself as based on a new revelation from God given
through Reverend Moon to prepare the world for the return of Christ. See id.at 22. The
Church claims as its sole mission the witnessing of the revelation and the laying of a foundation for the Kingdom of God on Earth. See id.; Comment, Piercingthe Religious Veil of the
So-Called Cults, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 655, 703-04 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Piercing the
Religious Veil].
1" See Ward v. Connor, 495 F. Supp. 434, 435 (E.D. Va. 1980); Piercing the Religious
Veil supra note 13, at 703-04. Reverend Moon, a self-proclaimed prophet, seeks to establish
a worldwide theocracy which would abolish the separation of church and state. See Piercing
the Religious Veil, supra note 13, at 703-04. Moon's political and religious convictions merge
in his vision of a victory over communism established in a final battle, instigated by God, involving the United States, Russia, China, North and South Korea, and Japan. See id. at 704.
As the Unification Church's political arm, the Freedom Leadership Foundation which Moon
established in the United States, seeks to promote his "Victory Over Communism" ideology.
See id.
"I See 495 F. Supp. at 435; Brief for Appellant at 3-4, Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (4th
Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
1" See 495 F. Supp. at 435; Brief for Appellant, supra note 15, at 5.
" See 495 F. Supp. at 435; Brief for Appellant, supra note 15, at 5.
" See 657 F.2d at 46. "Deprogramming" typically involves a third party attempting to
remove the effects of an individuars indoctrination into a cult's beliefs. See Piercing the
Religious Veil supra note 13, at 656 n.4. Deprogrammers, at the request of a parent or
other close relative, will seize a member of a religious sect and hold him against his will. See
id. at 670-71; LeMoult, DeprogrammingMembers of Religious Sects, 46 FORDHAM L. REV.
599, 603 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LeMoult]. Deprogrammers frequently encounter
resistance and thus must resort to physical force to subdue the cultist. See Piercing the
Religious Veil supra note 13, at 656 n.4. Deprogramming involves isolation of the individual, with the deprogrammer subjecting the individual to an unrelenting discourse on
why association with the cult should be terminated. See id.at 670-71. In this discourse the
deprogrammer may use mental, emotional and even physical pressures to cajole the individual into renouncing his religious beliefs. See LeMoult, supra at 603. Deprogrammers
charge fees of up to $25,000. See id.Ted Patrick, a renowned deprogrammer, claims to have
deprogrammed 1,500 individuals. See Piercingthe Religious Veil supra note 13, at 670 n.66.
Justification for deprogramming rests on the rationale that freedom of religion is impossible
without freedom of thought, and that deprogramming makes freedom of thought possible
1"
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suade Ward to recant failed, and Ward ultimately escaped.2" Ward filed
eight separate causes of action in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia against his parents and those who aided
in his detention.2' Ward's suit included an action under section 1985(c) for
a private conspiracy to deprive Ward of his right to free religious
association and free travel among the states.'
The district court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. Breckenridge to dismiss Ward's section 1985(c) claim.'
In Griffin a group of whites, mistaking several blacks for civil rights
workers, stopped the blacks' automobile on a public highway and beat
them. 4 The blacks brought a section 1985(c) action to recover compensatory and punitive damages.15 The Griffin Court abandoned the principle that section 1985(c) reaches only conspiracies involving some degree
of state participation.2" Instead, Griffin held that section 1985(c) provides
a remedy for injuries resulting from purely private, racially motivated
for the deprogrammed cult member. See Robbins, Religious Movements, The State and The
Law: Reconceptualizing "The Cult Problem," 9 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 33,40 (1980).
One deprogrammer who believes deprogramming is necessary to counter the effects of cult
brainwashing has likened deprogramming to "fighting fire with fire." See T. PATRICK, LEr
OUR CHILDREN Go! 76 (1976).
" See 657 F.2d at 46, Brief for Appellant, supra note 15, at 6-14.
See 495 F. Supp. at 435; Brief for Appellant, supra note 15, at 6-14.
2 See 657 F.2d at 46; Brief for Appellee at 1, Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir.
1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee]. In addition to the § 1985(c) private conspiracy
allegation, Ward further alleged under the laws of Virginia, conspiracy, assault, battery,
false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
grand larceny. See 495 F. Supp. at 436; Brief for Appellee, supra,at 1.
2 See 657 F.2d at 46-47. In Ward v. Connor Ward named 33 individuals as defendants,
including his parents, other relatives and non-relatives. See 495 F. Supp. at 436. Ward joined all 33 defendants in his 1985(c) conspiracy charge. See id- Ward sought injunctive relief
and compensatory and punitive damages. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 21, at 1.
13 See 495 F. Supp. at 436-47. See also 403 U.S. 88 (1971). Acting upon defendants'
12(b)(6) motion, the district court in Ward dismissed three counts of Ward's eight count indictment. See 657 F.2d at 46; note 21 supra; FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for
failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted). The Fourth Circuit considered only
the dismissal of Ward's allegation brought under § 1985(c) that the defendants engaged in a
conspiracy to deprive Ward of his civil rights. See 657 F.2d at 46-47; text accompanying
notes 59-63 infra.
24 See 403 U.S. at 89-91.
See idc. at 89, 92.
See id at 96. In Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951) the United States Supreme
Court dismissed a cause of action brought under § 47(3 of Title VIII of the United States
Code (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c)) because the action did not allege that the conspiracy of the defendants involved any state officials, or that the defendants acted under
color of state law. See id at 655. In Collins a political club meeting was disrupted by
American Legion members who threatened club members with violence. See id at 653-55.
The Collins Court held that the plaintiff club members had not alleged any deprivation
which Congress could properly regulate, since the first amendment prohibits only federal
and state deprivation of equal protection. See i& at 659-60.
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conspiracies to deprive a citizen of equal protection of the laws." The
Griffin Court cautioned, however, that while section 1985(c) prohibits
private conspiracies the section does not constitute a general federal
tort law.' To prevent the statute from becoming a general federal tort
law, the Supreme Court imposed two conditions which limit the statute's
availability to plaintiffs. 9 First, the Court required that the plaintiffs
show some racial, or otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus behind the conspirators' action. 0 Second, the Court mandated
that the plaintiffs identify congressional authority to justify extending
section 1985(c) to cover the-alleged private conspiracy.3"
" 403 U.S. at 102-03. In Griffin the Court reviewed the state action requirement announced in Collins v. Hardyman and concluded the language of § 1985(c) does not require
that the state initiate the action working the deprivation of equal protection. See 403 U.S. at
96-97. The Griffin Court noted that the legislative history preceding adoption of § 1985(c) as
originally introduced does not suggest that liability would not be imposed for purely private
conspiracies. See id. at 99-101. The Griffin Court thus concluded that Congress-intended §
1985(c) to reach private actions. See id. at 101. See generally Note, Civil Rights-Federal
Civil Rights Act § 473) Permits Civil Action Only Against PersonsActing Under Color of
State Law, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 122 (1951); Note, A Federal Remedy Against Private
Class DiscriminationUnder 42 U.S.C. § 19853) (1970)-Griffinv. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88
(1971), 47 WASH. L. REV. 353, 357 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Private Class Discrimination].
1 403 U.S. at 101-02. Only three federal statutes allow civil actions for damages. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1976). Section 1983 grants an action to any person deprived
under color of law of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or laws. Id. § 1983. The first subsection of § 1985 deals with conspiracy to prevent a
federal officer from performing his duties. Id. § 1985(c). The second part of § 1985 prohibits
conspiracies to obstruct justice. Id. § 1985(b). Section 1986 authorizes a civil action for
damages against anyone who, having power or authority to do so, knowingly fails to prevent
the commission of one of the wrongs specified in § 1985. Id. § 1986. See 25 U. MIAMI L. REV.
780, 781 n.5 (1971). In finding that § 1985(c) is not a general federal tort law the Supreme
Court in Griffin relied on legislative history. See 403 U.S. 101-02. The Court determined
that supporters of § 1985(c) as originally introduced did not intend the statute to apply to all
tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others. See id. at 101.
See 403 U.S. at 102, 104.
Id at 102. The class-based animus requirement of Griffin requires a plaintiff to
allege a conspiratorial purpose to deprive the plaintiff, as a member of a specific class of
persons, of his rights in order to state a cause of action under § 1985(c). See id. This conspiratorial purpose requirement necessitates a showing, not of a specific intent to deprive,
but rather of an underlying discriminatory intent to treat classes of citizens differently. See
id. at n.10; Deprogrammingof Religious Sect Members, supra note 7, at 234. Thus, § 1985(c)
contains no specific requirement of wilfulness but focuses on invidiously discriminatory
animus. See 403 U.S. at 102 n.10.
'I See 403 U.S. at 104. The Griffin Court justified congressional authority to enact §
1985(c) by identifying congressional power to protect constitutional rights and those rights
considered among the rights and privileges of national citizenship. See id. at 105-06. The
specific constitutional right the Griffin Court construed as the basis of congressional
authority for the action of § 1985(c)'s protection was the right to be free from slavery or involuntary servitude under the thirteenth amendment. See id. at 105; U.S. CONST. amend.
XIII. The Griffin Court recognized the right of interstate travel as among the rights and
privileges of national citizenship and as another source of congressional authority. See 403
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The district court in Ward found that section 1985(c) did not protect
against private conspiracies motivated by religious, rather than racial
prejudice.32 The district court viewed the Griffin class-based animus requirement to include discrimination on the basis of immutable characteristics such as race, national origin and sex.33 The district court reasoned
that Ward voluntarily joined the Unification Church and, unlike members
of a racial class, could presumably leave the Church if he desired.34 Additionally, the district court held that regardless of the animus requirement of Griffin, the defendants lacked the requisite religious bias.- The
district court viewed the defendants' activities as motivated not by an
intolerance of Ward's religious convictions, but by concern for the wellbeing of a family member." Finally the district court held that Ward
alleged no constitutional authority to support a section 1985(c) claim
under Griffin." The district court acknowledged that Ward alleged
deprivation of the right to travel from state to state, but found that the
gravamen of his complaint was interference with his first amendment
rights of freedom of religion and association.3 8 Stating that the first
U.S. at 105-06; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) (right to pass freely from tate
to state a right and privilege of national citizenship). The Griffin Court noted in identifying
these two sources of congressional power that it did not imply the absence of other constitional sources. See 403 U.S. at 107; note 2 supra. See generally Scope of § 1985(), supra
note 2, at 242-43; Remedies, supra note 1, at 318.
495 F. Supp. at 438.
' See id. at 437. The district court in Ward cited Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368
F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974) in discerning the Griffin
class-based animus requirement. 495 F. Supp. at 437. In Bellamy the plaintiff sued his
former employer under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3), 1986, and 2000e-2 for reinstatement and
damages, alleging that he was fired for belonging to the Ku Klux Klan. See 368 F. Supp. at
1026. The district court found that membership in the Ku Klux Klan did not constitute
membership in a class protected under § 1985(c) because the members of the Ku Klux Klan
did not possess discrete, insular and immutable characteristics comparable to those
characterizing classes such as race, national original and sex. See id. at 1028. See generally
Note, Civil Rights: Private Discrimination, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 473, 488 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Private Discrimination].
See 495 F. Supp. at 437.
s See id.
See id. The district court in Ward acknowledged that courts have recognized a cause
of action under § 1985(c) for plaintiffs who have been victims of conspiracies motivated by
religious bias. See id. The district court, however, relied on two cases to support its finding
that the defendants lacked the necessary bias because they were concerned only for Ward's
welfare. See 495 F. Supp. at 438; Styn v. Styn No. 79-3468, slip op. at
, (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7,
1980); Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717, 724 (D.R.I.), affd, 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979). Both Styn and'Weiss concerned suits brought under § 1985(c) by
religious cult members alleging deprivation of civil rights by family members and others
who attempted to deprogram the cult members. See No. 79-3468, slip op. at _ 453 F.
Supp. at 718-21. Both courts found that the familial concern the parents demonstrated did
not support a showing of invidiously discriminatory animus. See No. 79-2468, slip op. at
-;
453 F. Supp. at 724; note 62 infra.
495 F. Supp. at 438.
See id.; text accompanying notes 59-63 infra.
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amendment protects against only governmental interference with these
rights, the district court concluded that without an allegation of state action in the conspiracy, Ward's section 1985(c) complaint lacked the required constitutional authorization 9 Ward appealed the district court's
dismissal of his section 1985(c) claim to the Fourth Circuit. 0
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Ward's
section 1985(c) complaint.4 The Ward court held that religious discrimination falls within the ambit of section 1985(c)," and that Ward and other
Unification Church members constituted a class entitled to the protection of the statute The Fourth Circuit further held that Ward's allegation that the defendants interfered with his right to interstate travel
had a sufficient constitutional basis to support Ward's section 1985(c)
claim.44
The Fourth Circuit relied on a footnote from Griffin to conclude that
section 1985(c) protects religious groups. 5 In the footnote, the Supreme
Court cited congressional testimony preceding enactment of the statute
from which section 1985(c) originated." The testimony states that the
statute would prohibit a conspiracy formed against an individual based
on his religious affiliation.4" The Fourth Circuit reasoned that although
the Griffin Court did not decide whether section 1985(c) applied exclusively to cases where racial bias is a motivating factor of a
I See 495 F. Supp. at 438. The district court concluded that Ward's complaint was
deficient without an allegation of state interference on the basis of Bellamy v. Mason's
Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974). See 495 F. Supp. at 438. The Bellamy court conceded
that state action is not required for application of § 1985(c), yet declared that in the case
before the court the § 1985(c) claim required some degree of state involvement. See 508 F.2d
at 506. The Bellamy court reasoned that the first amendment right of freedom of association
is protected through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment against state interference, but not against interference by private persons. See id2 at 505-07; NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (freedom of association assured by due process clause of
fourteenth amendment). Thus, under Bellamy, freedom of association was constitutionally
protected only against state interference. See 508 F.2d at 507; note 33 supra; Private
Discrimination,supra note 33, at 486-87.
'o

See 657 F.2d at 46-47.

Id at 49.
Id. at 48.
4 id.
I
4

See id. at 47-48; 403 U.S. at 102 n.9.
See 403 U.S. at 102 n.9. See also Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; note 1

supra.
'7 See 657 F.2d at 48; Cong. Globe, 42d Congress, 1st Sess. 567 (1871). The Griffin
Court cites and the Ward court quotes the remarks of Senator Edmunds of Vermont made
during debates preceding passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See 403 U.S. at 102 n.9;
657 F.2d at 48; Cong. Globe, 42d Congress, 1st Sess. 567. Senator Edmunds stated that if a
conspiracy was formed against someone because he was, for example, a Democrat, or a
Catholic, or a Methodist, then the legislation would provide a cause of action for redress.
See Cong. Globe, 42d Congress, 1st Sess. 567 (1871). See also 403 U.S. at 102 n.9; 657 F.2d at
78.
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conspiracy,48 the Court's reference to the testimony indicated that the
Supreme Court did not intend such a limitation.49 The Fourth Circuit in
Ward responded to the district court's failure to find a class-based
animus by determining that the complaint sufficiently charged that the
conspiracy was based on animosity towards Ward's chosen religious
organization, rather than on familial relations.50 The Fourth Circuit did
not question the district court's assumption that parental concern
motivated the conspiracy, but nevertheless observed that Ward's complaint sufficiently alleged that the defendants' hostility towards
members of the Unification Church motivated the conspiracy.5 1Thus, the
Fourth Circuit found Ward's action met Griffin's first requirement that
plaintiffs show a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus behind
the conspirators' actions. 2
The Fourth Circuit also found that Ward's action met Griffin's second requirement that plaintiffs identify congressional authority to
justify extending section 1985(c) to cover the defendants' conspiracy. 3
The Supreme Court recognized constitutional authority to reach the conspiracy alleged in Griffin in section two of the thirteenth amendment'
and in the right of interstate travel.5 The Fourth Circuit stated that the
thirteenth amendment could not serve as constitutional authority to support Ward's section 1985(c) claim because Ward is not a member of the
Negro race.56 The Ward court reasoned, however, that constitutional
" See 403 U.S. at 102 n.9. The Griffin Court failed to identify any rights or classes protected by § 1985(c) other than the thirteenth amendment right to be free from slavery and
the right of interstate travel. See id. at 105-06. The Griffin Court noted it did not have to
find the section constitutional with all its applications to uphold the constitutionality of §
1985(c). See id. at 104; note 31 supra.
9 See 657 F.2d at 48.
so See id. at 49.

See id. at 48. The Fourth Circuit in Ward did not decide whether parental concern
or class-based animus motivated the conspiracy. See id. The Ward court held only that
Ward's allegation of discriminatory motive was sufficient to support a § 1985(c) claim. See
id.; text accompanying note 62 infra.
5 See 657 F.2d at 48; text accompanying note 30 supra.
' See 657 F.2d at 48; text accompanying note 31 supra.
- See 403 U.S. at 105. The Griffin Court held that creation of a statutory cause of action for black victims of racially discriminatory conspiracies aimed at depriving them of
basic rights is within Congress' powers to legislate against the badges and incidents of
slavery, under § 2 of the thirteenth amendment. Id. See Private Class Discrimination,
supra note 27, at 361; note 31 supra.
" See 403 U.S. at 106. Although not an explicit constitutional right, the right of interstate travel, is among the rights and privileges of national citizenship. See id; note 31
supra.
1 657 F.2d at 48. In Ward, § 2 of the thirteenth amendment did not apply as a source of
congressional power to reach the conspiracy because Ward did not allege membership in a
racial class. See id. at 47. Congressional power to reach the badges and incidents of slavery
appears unavailable where groups which do not share the heritage of slavery are involved.
See Note, FederalRemedy to Redress Private Deprivations of Civil Rights, 85 HARv. L.
RaV. 95, 104 (1971).
21
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power to reach the conspiracy derived from Ward's charge that a purpose of the conspiracy was to deprive Ward of his right to travel from
state to state.57 Thus, the court held Ward's allegation sufficient to support his cause of action.'
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Ward highlights the district court's
faulty analysis of the defendants' motion to dismiss. In considering the
defendants' motion the district court did not construe Ward's section
1985(c) complaint in the light most favorable to Ward. 9 The district court
inappropriately looked beyond the mere sufficiency of Ward's complaint
when it sought to discern the gravamen of the complaint." By contrast,
the Fourth Circuit held only that Ward's allegation of discriminatory
motive was sufficient to support a section 1985(c) claim. Additionally,
the district court in determining that the defendants' class-based animus
was insufficient to support the section 1985(c) claim imputed a motivation behind the conspiracy based on defendants' familial relationship
with Ward, rather than on defendants' abhorence of the Unification
Church.2 The cases which the district court cited to support its finding
" See 657 F.2d at 48.
See id.
, See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For purposes of a motion to dismiss made under Rule
12(b)(6), a complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (for purposes of dismissal motion complaint's
allegations taken as admitted, complaint to be liberally construed in favor of plaintiff);
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mech. & Chem. Corp., 383 U.S. 172, 174-75 (1965)
(material allegations of counterclaim taken as admitted); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957) (complaint not to be dismissed unless appellant could prove no facts to support his
claim). See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 5 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357

n.46 (1969).
See 495 F. Supp. at 438.
1

See 657 F.2d at 48.

See 495 F. Supp. at 437-38. The analysis the district court adopted in Ward that
finds no discriminatory motive in a conspiracy because the conspiracy is based on concern
for a loved one has been criticized as misreading Griffin. See Deprogramming of Religious
Sect Members, supra note 7, at 241. The plaintiff under the Griffin standard must allege in
a § 1985(c) action a conspiratorial purpose to deprive the plaintiff, as a member of a class, of
his rights. See 403 U.S. at 102 n.10. Thus, in a deprogramming situation, even though defendants believe they are helping the plaintiff their personal concern about the plaintiff does
not destroy the class-based nature of their animus if hostility towards the plaintiffs
religious group causes their concern. See id.; Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481, 490-91 (N.D.
Cal. 1978) (plaintiff demonstrated sufficient class-based animus in action against family
members for deprogramming). But see Styn v. Styn No. 179-3468, slip op. at (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 7, 1980) (deprogramming attempt motivated by concern for family member not classbased animus); Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717, 723-24 (D.R.I.), affd, 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir.
1978), cert denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979) (deprogramming attempt motivated by material concern not class-based animus). Courts generally have required that class-based animus be
directed against plaintiff as a member of a class, not as an individual. See Scope of§ 1985(8,
supra note 2, at 252. See, e.g., Crabtree v. Brennan, 466 F.2d 480, 481 (6th Cir. 1972) (nontenured teacher's suit dismissed for not alleging class-based bias); Jacobson v. Industrial
Foundation of the Permian Basin, 456 F.2d 258, 259 (5th Cir. 1972) (insufficient class alleged
to support membership); Schoonfield v. Mayor, 399 F. Supp. 1068, 1086 (D. Md. 1975), affd
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that section 1985(c) offered Ward no remedy were rendered on the
merits of the actions and not in response to a motion to dismiss. 3 Thus,
the district court in Ward improperly scrutinized the substantive issues
of Ward's action, instead of confining its inquiry to the sufficiency of
Ward's complaint.
In addition to improperly ruling upon the defendants' motion to
dismiss, the district court adopted a narrow view of the scope of section
1985(c) that other federal courts have not accepted, and which runs
counter to the clear implication of the Supreme Court's decision in Griffin" Despite the narrow holding in Griffin, lower federal courts have
concluded that section 1985(c) actions are not limited to classes defined
by race, 65 and have extended coverage of section 1985(c) to religious
groups." Even those federal courts which denied section 1985(c) claims
sub nom. Schoonfield v. Baltimore, 544 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1976) (facts alleged did not show
class-based discrimination); Doyle v. Unicare Health Servs. Inc., 399 F. Supp. 69, 75 (N.D. Ill.
1975), aff'd, 541 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1976) (no membership in class alleged); Meyer v. Curran,
397 F. Supp. 512, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (complaint dismissed for failure to allege class-based
animus).
(Feb. 7, 1980, N.D. Ill.) (slip opinion);
See Styn v. Styn, No. 79-3468, slip op. Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717, 722 (D.R.I.), affd, 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979); note 36 supra.
See 495 F. Supp. at 437; note 47 supra; text accompanying notes 65 & 66 infra.
See Curran v. Portland Super. School Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063, 1085 (D. Maine
1977) (class based on sex). Section 1985(c) prohibits conspiracies motivated by sex-based
animus. Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 1975), modified sub nom. Life
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979) (sex bias is sufficiently classbased to come within § 1985(c)); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494, 501 (W.D.
Pa. 1974) (same); Stern v. Massachusetts Indemnity & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433, 443
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (same). A section 1985(c) cause of action exists in conspiracies motivated by
invidiously discriminatory intent directed towards supporters of a particular political candidate. Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973) (supporters of a political candidate protected by § 1985(c)); Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 839-41 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976) (same). See also Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 927
(9th Cir. 1975) (assuming without deciding that legality of residence status creates a class
cognizable under Griffin); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 912 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975) (persons critical of government officials and policies); Westberry
v. Gilman Paper Company, 507 F.2d 206; 215 (5th Cir.), opinion withdrawn and vacated as
moot, 507 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1975) (member of group of environmentalists); Smith v. Cherry,
489 F.2d 1098, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974) (voters who were
deceived as to actual effect of their vote).
" See 657 F.2d at 48; Marlowe Y. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1059, 1064-65 (6th Cir.
1973) (member of Jewish faith); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir. 1971) (en
banc) (Catholic worshippers); Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481, 491 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (same);
Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692, 694 (D.D.C. 1973) ("Children of God" member). See
also Jackson v. Associated Hospital Service of Philadelphia, 414 F. Supp. 315, 324 (E.D. Pa.
1976), aff'd, 549 F.2d 795 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1977) (no cause of action under §
1985(c) absent readily discernible class of plaintiffs whose religious exercise had been infringed upon); Western Telecasters, Inc. v. California Federation of Labor, 415 F. Supp. 30,
33 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (discrimination based on religion may provide necessary animus for §
1985(c) action) citing with approval, Arnold v. Tiffany, 359 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (C.D. Cal.
1973), aff'd on other grounds 487 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974)
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have done so not on the basis that section 1985(c) fails to protect
members of religious groups, but rather on the basis of plaintiffs failure
to demonstrate a sufficient invidiously discriminatory, class-based
animus." Although the Griffin opinion is narrowly confined, the Fourth
Circuit correctly followed the inference of the Griffin Court's citation to
legislative history, as well as the precendent of other federal courts in
holding that section 1985(c) extends to religious group members. 8
The Griffin Court's lack of explicit guidance has caused confusion
among the lower courts, resulting in an expansion of the range of classes
eligible to bring suit in federal court under section 1985(c)." Since Griffin, the Supreme Court has not further explained the rights and classes
that section 1985(c) protects. 0 Generally, however, the Court's trend has
been to limit access to the federal court system." By extending coverage
(class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus refers to odious class discrimination such as
(N.D.
discrimination based on religion). But see Styn v. Styn, No. 79-3468, slip op. at -,
Feb. 7,1980) (slip opinion) (no class-based religious animus present); Weiss v. Patrick, 453
Ill.
F. Supp. 717, 724 (D.R.I.), affd, 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979)
(absence of class-based religious animus). See note 36 supra.
Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. at 724; note 36
" See Styn v. Styn, No. 79-3465 at _;
supra.
" See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
"l See Seizer v. Berkowitz, 459 F. Supp. 347, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Griffin created more
confusion than it resolved); note 65 supra. Federal courts have agreed that failure to allege
any class-based animus is a fatal defect to a § 1985(c) action. See McLellan v. Mississippi
Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 928 (5th Cir. 1977), modified, 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977)
(en banc) (class-based bias must be alleged to sustain § 1985(c) claim); Jackson v. Cox, 540
F.2d 209, 210 (5th Cir. 1976) (complaint in § 1985(c) action failed to allege class-based invidiously discriminatory intent); Timson v. Wright, 532 F.2d 552, 553 (6th Cir. 1976) (no allegation of racial or class animosity in complaint alleging § 1985(c) claim); McNally v. Pulitzer
Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69, 74 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976) (no allegation of
class-based discriminatory motive in complaint alleging § 1985(c) violation); Glasson v. City
of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 911 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975) (must be some
racial, or class-based discriminatory animus behind conspirators' action); Waits v.
McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 1975) (no cause of action under § 1985(c) because no
allegation of racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus); Hamilton v. Chaffin,
506 F.2d 904, 914 n.23 (5th Cir. 1975) (§ 1985(c) action requires some racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus); Thomas v. Economic Action Comm., 504 F.2d 563, 564-65
(5th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff failed to state § 1985(c) claim by not alleging denial of equal protection of the law); Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973) (complaint in § 1985(c) action must allege conspiracy to deprive class of persons equal protection of laws).
70 See 657 F.2d at 48. In Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366
(1979), the Supreme Court declined the opportunity to define the specific federal rights
which § 1985(c) protects. See id. at 378; note 2 supra;Remedies, supra note 1, at 310.
" See Remedies, supra note 1, at 316. In cases where federal and state courts both
have jurisdiction, the Supreme Court tends to defer jurisdiction to state courts, and deny
access to federal courts when feasible. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-99 (1976). See
generally Morrison, Rights Without Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the Federal
Courts out of the Business of ProtectingFederalRights, 30 RUTGEnS L. REV. 841 (1977). The
Supreme Court has confirmed this trend in Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. Novotny with regard. to § 1985(c). See 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979); Remedies, supra note 1, at
316. Although the trend of the Supreme Court has been to limit access to federal courts, the
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of section 1985(c) to religious groups, the Ward decision has established
in the Fourth Circuit a new class of plaintiffs with access to the federal
courts. 2 Unanswered by the Ward decision, however, is the question of
whether the class must allege a private conspiracy to violate rights in
addition to first amendment rights to enjoy section 1985(c)'s protection.:3
Thus, access to federal courts in the Fourth Circuit may be qualified by
the restriction that plaintiffs allege a private conspiracy to deprive them
of more than just religious rights2' Nevertheless, in reversing the
district court to allow Ward's section 1985(c) suit the Fourth Circuit correctly confirmed a right of access to the federal judicial system which
the Supreme Court only implied.
MATTHEW

L.

KIMBALL

Supreme Court's decision in Griffin greatly expanded the protection of § 1985(c) by dispensing with the "state action" requirement previously deemed essential. See Note, State Action No Longer A Requisite Under 42 U.S.C. § 19853), 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 168, 169
(1971); text accompanying note 27 supra.
' See 657 F.2d at 48. Before Ward, the Fourth Circuit declined to decide whether §
1985(c) proscribed conspiracies motivated .by invidious intent other than racial bias. See
Rodgers v. Tolson, 582 F.2d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 1978) (class of political and philosophical opponents to town commissioners); Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326, 1333-34 (4th Cir.
1976) (employment discrimination based on sex); Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d 6,
10 (4th Cir. 1972) (victims of assault and battery).
" See 657 F.2d at 48. The Fourth Circuit in Ward did not have to consider whether
first amendment rights derived through the fourteenth amendment establish sufficient
authority to extend § 1985(c)'s protection against violations of these rights. See id. at 48 n.5.
The Ward court found sufficient constitutional authority in Ward's allegation that he was
deprived of the right to travel from state to state. See id. at 48. The Fourth Circuit noted its
earlier decision involving first and fourteenth amendment rights and § 1985(c) in Bellamy v.
Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974), and acknowledged the question was
troublesome. See id. at 48 n.5; note 39 supra.
7' See 657 F.2d at 48. At least one circuit has found in the first and fourteenth amendments sources of constitutional authority sufficient to satisfy the Griffin v. Brechenridgerequirement that a source of congressional authority be found to support extension of §
1985(c) protection. See Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc). See also 403
U.S. at 104. In Action, the Eighth Circuit en banc declared that § 1985(c) reached purely
private conspiracies to interfere with first amendment rights of freedom of assembly and
worship through § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See 450 F.2d at 1235. Thus while the
facts of Ward did not require the Fourth Circuit to consider an extension of § 1985(c) as the
Eighth Circuit postulated, the Action decision suggests that the scope of § 1985(c) may encompass protection of rights of religious freedom without requiring association with other
constitutional rights. See Private Discrimination,supra note 33, at 486 n.79.

